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SUPERVISORY JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES IN QUEBEC
By DENIS LEMiEuX*
The control of the legality of administrative action in Quebec has given
rise to many judicial decisions in recent years. Constitutional problems related
to the procedural aspects of judicial review have also frequently originated in
Qu6bec. The inclusion of the old common law remedies, such as prerogative
writs, in the Code of Civil Procedure1 has modified those remedies in some
respects. Particular statutes have provided other characteristics of the Qu6bec
law of judicial review. Since 1971 the existence of the Federal Court has
further modified the picture.
The purpose of this paper is to examine judicial review in Qu6bec, and
to comment on the recent proposals for reform of judicial review put forward
by the "Comit6 sur la revision judiciaire" in Qu6bec, and by the Law Reform
Commission of Canada in its Working Paper No. 18, "Federal Court-
Judicial Review."
' 2
I. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN QUEBEC
The present system of judicial review in Quebec originated in the Treaty
of Paris of 1763, by which France ceded to Great Britain the territory that is
now the province of Qu6bec. A consequence of that cession was the intro-
duction in Qu6bec of the public law of England, as part of the new political
regime. The common law relating to the Crown and other public bodies was
thus made part of Quebec law (already a mixture of civil and common law).
A new system of courts, virtually modelled on the judicial structure
utilized in England, was rapidly set up. The Court of King's Bench thus
acquired original jurisdiction in many fields, including the power to grant
prerogative writs and other remedies. In 1849 a reform of the court system
in Quebec (then Lower Canada) conferred to the Superior Court the original
jurisdiction in civil matters that belonged to the Court of King's Bench, which
was to become a Court of Appeal.3 From then on, the Superior Court be-
came the depositary of the supervisory jurisdiction over public authorities in
Qu6bec.4
© Copyright, 1979, Denis Lemieux.
* Faculty of Law, Laval University.
S.Q. 1965, c. 80.
2 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Federal Court: Judicial Review (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply & Services, 1976).
3 An Act to amend the Laws relative to the Courts of Original Civil Jurisdiction in
Lower-Canada, 1849 S.C., c. 38.
4 For a good historical development, see Three Rivers Boatman Ltd. v. CLRB,
[1969] S.C.R. 607 at 615-16, 12 D.L.R. (3d) 710 at 716-17. More generally, see Dus-
sault, Traitd de droit administratif canadien et qu~b&cois (Qu6bec: Les Presses de
runiversit6 Laval, 1974) at 1105-12.
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The British North America Act, 18 6 75 took into account the system of
courts functioning in the colonies that were to become part of the new feder-
ation. Indeed, section 129 of the B.N.A. Act provided for the continuation
of the existing courts, including, of course, the Superior Court. However,
section 96 stated that, from then on, members of the provincial Superior
Court should be appointed by the Governor General, and not by provincial
authorities. This provision of the B.N.A. Act did not follow the concept of
shared jurisdiction between federal and provincial authorities, and was to
become a "sword of Damocles" over provincial court organization, especially
in Qu6bec.
Conversely, the administration of justice itself, "including the constitu-
tion, maintenance, and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and of
criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in those courts,"
was conferred to the provinces by section 92(14) of the B.N.A. Act.
This general jurisdiction, however, was overshadowed by another pro-
vision of the B.N.A. Act, section 101, which stated that:
The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from time
to time provide for the constitution, maintenance, and organization of a general
court of appeal for Canada, and for the establishment of any additional courts
for the better administration of the laws of Canada.
This provision left open the possibility of a parallel system of federal and
provincial (including superior and appeal) courts.
Under section 101, the Federal Parliament created the Supreme Court
of Canada, which was eventually to become the final court of appeal in
Canada. Parliament also set up the Exchequer Court and gave it jurisdiction
in various fields, such as admiralty law, federal taxation, actions arising from
federal government contracts and torts, etc. The Court was later to acquire
appellate jurisdiction for some federal administrative tribunals. The emergence
of these tribunals in recent years and the relative importance of their deci-
sions have made it more crucial to know with certainty which court has the
power to supervise these new agencies.
Several decisions emanating from federal boards had been reviewed as a
matter of course by the Qu6bec courts, but the issue was not finally solved
by the Supreme Court of Canada until 1969 in the Three Rivers Boatman
case.0 In this case, a trade union representing some employees of Three Rivers
Boatman Ltd. applied before the Labour Relations Board of Canada to be
certified as bargaining agent for these employees. The employer contended
at the hearing that the Board had no jurisdiction in the matter, since the
works were under provincial jurisdiction. Accordingly, he requested that the
Superior Court quash the proceedings by way of a writ of evocation (analo-
gous to prohibition and certiorari). The union, however, argued that the
Superior Court had no jurisdiction to grant such a writ against a federal
tribunal, as article 33 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure had only con-
5 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
6 Supra note 4. A number of instances where federal boards' decisions were con-
trolled by provincial courts are referred to at 617 (S.C.R.), 718 (D.L.R.).
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ferred jurisdiction to the Court over "bodies politic and corporate within the
Province." The Supreme Court decided unanimously that the Superior Court
had inherent supervisory jurisdiction over federal as well as provincial author-
ities. It was held that no statutory mention of the power of judicial review
was necessary and that only the Federal Parliament could affect that juris-
diction with regard to federal boards.
Less than two years later, the Federal Court Act was enacted.7 The new
Court retained the functions of the Exchequer Court and was given additional
jurisdiction. In particular, section 18 of the Act gave the Trial Division of
the Court exclusive jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of prohibition,
certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and declaration against federal authori-
ties. 8 The Federal Court, therefore, has a limited jurisdiction over federal
agencies and departments operating in Qudbec, whereas the Superior Court
is competent to supervise provincial authorities and has some residual powers
in relation to federal authorities.
HI. THE SUPERVISORY POWER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
From its inception, the Superior Court has had an inherent jurisdiction
over prerogative writs and other remedies, but its powers were modified by
the Code of Civil Procedure and other statutes. A reform of the law of judi-
cial remedies is being considered at this time. It aims at simplifying and unify-
ing the existing remedies.
A. Origin of the Remedies
As we have seen, the common law of judicial remedies was introduced
in Quebec soon after the Treaty of Paris, and was not much affected by the
first statutes and ordinances, which dealt primarily with the organization of
the court system. Mention of habeas corpus and other prerogative writs was
to be found in some statutes, but these remedies were still granted according
to the conditions set forward by the common law.9
Not until the adoption of the second Code of Civil Procedure in 1897
(the first one was enacted in 1861 but was a consolidation of existing statutes)
was there an attempt to codify the rules concerning the common law reme-
dies.'0 It is remarkable that this codification took place within a Code in-
fluenced by the French "Ordonnance sur la proc6dure civile, 1667," which
was in force in Quebec before 1763."1
7 R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.), c. 10.
8 See Lemieux and Valli~res, Le fondement constitutionnel du pouvoir de contrdle
judiciare exercd par la Cour fiddrale du Canada (1975), 2 Dal. L.J. 268. The Quebec
courts have acknowledged their loss of jurisdiction to the Federal Court. See, for in-
stance, Lafleur v. Hillinger, [19761 C.A. 377.
9 See Hamilton v. Fraser, [1811] Stu. K.B. 21, 1 RJ.R.Q. 115 (prohibition); and
R. v. Gingras, [18331 Stu. K.B. 560, 1 R.J.R.Q. 413 (certiorari) for early illustrations
of judicial review in Qudbec.
10 See LeDain, The Supervisory Jurisdiction in Quebec (1957), 35 Can. B. Rev. 788
at 791 ff.
11 See Bourdon v. Citg de Montreal (1918), 54 C.S. 193, 24 R. de Jur. 543; and
Ethier v. DeLimbourg (1918), 55 C.S. 179.
1979]
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B. Present Remedies
Prerogative writs are part of the present Code of Civil Procedure, en-
acted in 1965. The Code also includes other private law remedies. The Qu6bec
courts have developed the direct action in nullity, while additional remedies
are found in various statutes.
1. The Prerogative Writs
The Code of Civil Procedure represents an attempt to codify all existing
law concerning the prerogative writs in civil matters. However, the common
law is still used to interpret the provisions of the Code, and to supplement
them if necessary.
a) Evocation
One of the changes introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1965
was the unification of prohibition and certiorari, which eliminated many diffi-
culties encountered in the past. The law had previously been uncertain as to
the proper time to grant a writ of certiorari, as opposed to a writ of prohibi-
tion. This situation was well illustrated in the famous case of L'Alliance des
professeurs catholiques de Montrial v. LRB,12 where a writ of prohibition
was claimed against an order of the Labour Relations Board. The Supreme
Court engaged in a perilous exercise in semantics, and finally granted a dec-
laration of nullity in favour of the claimant, but not the writ of prohibition
itself. The writ of evocation has thus simplified the matter, since it covers the
same ground as did the former writs of prohibition and certiorari.
In other respects, however, the courts have interpreted quite strictly
article 846 of the Code, which defines evocation in the following terms:
The Superior Court may, at the demand of one of the parties, evoke before
judgment a case pending before a court subject to its superintending and reforming
power, or revise a judgment already rendered by such court....
The conditions required for the obtention of a writ of evocation are:
(1) The "court" must be a statutory board. This excludes boards such
as arbitration boards created by contract or otherwise than by sta-
tute.13 (In this respect, evocation is more limited than certiorari.14);
and
(2) That body must act judicially, i.e.,
(a) the statute must provide for a hearing or other adversary-type
proceedings, or
(b) the decision is likely to affect the rights of the claimant and the
statute contains some indication that a quasi-judicial procedure
was to be followed by the administrative authority involved.
The mere fact that a decision affects the rights of the claimant is not
sufficient; this again is a departure from English law as established by Ridge
12 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140, [19531 4 D.L.R. 161.
I3 See National Equestrian Fed'n of Can. v. Martin, [1975] R.P. 146 (Qu6. C.A.).
14 Compare with R. v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., Ex parte Lain, [1967] 2 Q.B.
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v. Baldwin.15 The position now taken by the Court has been expressed clearly
in Saulnier v. Commission de police du Qudbec.16 In a more recent case, Mr.
Justice Pigeon reaffirmed that in the Saulnier case, "Judicial review was
granted because, not only was there a duty to act judicially [in the Police Act]
but the decision affected the rights of the applicant. At the risk of repetition
I will stress that this does not mean that wherever the decision affects the
rights of the applicant, there is a duty to act judicially."'
17
This approach is in accordance with the literal meaning of the words of
article 846. However, it is a source of interminable problems as to the quali-
fication of the administrative process. Does the allocation of permits or grants
affect rights? Does an inquiry involve a duty to act judicially? The "right"
answer to these questions was made more important by the fact that evoca-
tion had to be used instead of the direct action in nullity, as we will see later.
b) Habeas Corpus
Fortunately, the writ of habeas corpus does not present the same prob-
lem. Article 851 of the Code provides that:
Any person who is confined or otherwise restrained of his liberty, except under
an order in civil matters granted by a court or a judge having jurisdiction, or for
some criminal or supposed criminal matter, or any other person on his behalf,
may apply to a judge of the Superior Court to obtain a writ of habeas corpus
ordering the person under whose custody he is detained to bring him forthwith
before a judge of the court and to show the cause of his detention, so that it may
be decided whether such detention is justified.
The writ of habeas corpus would be available to a person who is de-
tained against his will (and without proper authorization) in a hospital, an
asylum or a welfare centre. It is used quite sparingly, and has given rise to
few cases dealing with provincial authorities. Lack of legal counsel, or the
fact that evocation has found relative success in the past in similar situa-
tions,' 8 probably explain this sparsity of cases. In civil-especially immigra-
tion-matters, however, habeas corpus is still used in relation to federal
authorities, since it is not included in section 18 of the Federal Court Act.
c) Mandamus
Article 844 of the Code states that:
Any person interested may apply to the court to obtain an order commanding a
person to perform a duty or an act which is not of a purely private nature ....
It is used to prohibit some act, or to force the exercise of a duty.
The conditions for the obtainment of the writ of mandamus are similar
to those developed by the common law. However, a particular feature of
Qu6bec law is that mandamus may lie against private bodies, when these
bodies have public duties. For instance, one may force a corporation to hold
IS [1964] A.C. 40, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66.
16 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 572, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 545.
17 Martineau v. Matsqui Inst. Inmate Disciplinary Bd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118 at 133,
74 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 12, 33 C.C.C. (2d) 366 at 377.
18 See, for instance, Topalinsky v. Prdvost, [1968] C.S. 286.
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an annual meeting of shareholders as stipulated by its articles or charter.10
Thus, mandamus in Quebec has a wider scope than its English counterpart.
Occasionally, it even supersedes the mandatory injunction, which also exists
in Qu6bec law.
The difficulty with mandamus lies mostly with the kind of relief that can
be obtained through the use of the writ. It is certain that the nullity of a
decision cannot be the main relief sought, but the claimant may, and some-
times should, apply for a declaration of nullity as subsidiary or incidental
relief.20 There are also contradictory decisions as to the availability of dam-
ages as a joint remedy with mandamus.
21
d) Quo Warranto
While the writ of quo warranto has been abolished in England, and is
rarely used in other common law jurisdictions, it still flourishes in Qu6bec,
where it is used against provincial and local officials, primarily to question
the statutory qualification of elected municipal councillors. However, the
Municipal Bribery and Corruption Actm has provided for a new remedy with
more severe penalties in situations where the writ of quo warranto had been
used in the past.
One particular feature of quo warranto in Qu6bec is that its application
is not limited to public offices, but also extends to private offices, such as
directorships of private corporations. 2s This is due to the language used in
article 838 of the Code, which provides that:
When a person occupies or exercises illegally, either a public office or a franchise
in the Province, or an office in a public or private corporation, a public body or
board or a group of persons contemplated by article 60, any person interested
may apply to the court for an order that he be ousted therefrom; he may even
ask that a third party be declared to be entitled to such office or franchise, if he
alleges the facts necessary to show that he is entitled to it.
As it stands, the writ of quo warranto is still helpful in Qu6bec and does
not present any serious difficulties. It is a popular remedy and is available to
attack illegal nominations to public boards and to determine whether an
elected official is eligible to keep his seat.
e) The Residual Influence of the Common
Law Prerogative Writs
While the Code of Civil Procedure has attempted to replace the old pre-
rogative writs, it may not have covered some aspects of the common law. In
9 See Fleury v. Socquet, [1973] C.A. 135. Compare with Davies v. Gas Light &
Coke Co., [1909] 1 Ch. 708, 78 L.J. Ch. 445; R. v. Bank of England (1819), 2 B. &
Aid. 620, 106 E.R. 492; R. v. London Assurance Co. (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 899, 106 F.R.
1420; and Holland v. Dickson (1888), 37 Ch. D. 669, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1549.
2 0 H6pital Ste-Jeanne dArc v. Garneau, [1959] B.R. 583, aff'd [1961] S.C.R. 426;
Intertrade Industries Ltd. v. Cit4 de CMte St-Luc, [1965] C.S. 369.
21 Compare Communauti Urbaine de Montrial v. Regglo Foods Inc., [1976] C.A.
465; and Corporation de l'H6pital Bellechasse v. Pilotte, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 454, 56 D.L.R.
(3d) 702.
2 2 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 173.
2 3 See Ghimpelman v. Bercovici, [1957] S.C.R. 128, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 193,
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such a case, the Superior Court would be tempted to grant a common law
writ under its inherent jurisdiction, as long as such a remedy is not specifically
prohibited by law. This reasoning would be in line with article 20 of the
Code:
Wherever this Code contains no provision for exercising any right, any proceed-
ing may be adopted which is not inconsistent with this Code or with some other
provisions of law.
The occasion to put such reasoning to the test arose recently in Distribu-
tions Kingma Lte v. CCAQ.24 The defendant contended that the word "party"
in article 846 did not include the claimant, who was only an intervenor before
the administrative tribunal. The Court rejected this argument but added that,
had it been true that the word "party" had such a restricted sense, the Court
would have been ready to issue a writ of certiorari, even if the writ had dis-
appeared from the Code.
In criminal matters, the Superior Court of criminal jurisdiction still relies
on the common law to exercise its jurisdiction concerning prohibition, certio-
rari, mandamus and habeas corpus. This sphere of law is not covered by the
Quebec law of civil procedure, as it is not included in section 92(14) of the
B.N.A. Act. The Canadian Criminal Code25 has not provided for these reme-
dies, except to state their existence.26 The inherent power of the Court is
exercised against inferior courts of criminal jurisdiction, but is not normally
used against administrative authorities. We will see later how the Federal
Court Act may have affected the supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior
Court in criminal matters.
2. Private Law Remedies
The Code of Civil Procedure contains additional remedies that are wide-
ly used against provincial departments and agencies.
a) Injunction
This remedy has been widely used in the past in labour relations matters.
More recently, it has also been used against Ministers in situations where
mandamus might have been thought more appropriate. Article 751 of the
Code defines the injunction as "an order of the Superior Court or of a judge
thereof enjoining a person, his officers, agents or employees, not to do or to
cease doing, or, in cases which admit of it, to perform a particular act or
operation, under pain of all legal penalties." Injunction is a popular remedy,
as it may be used in conjunction with other recourses. It may be interlocutory
or permanent. There are few differences between a mandatory injunction and
a writ of mandamus, and it is very difficult to tell one from the other where
the duty of a person is not of a private nature.
b) Declaratory Judgment
This remedy was introduced for the first time in 1965 in the Code.
Article 453 provides that "any person who has an interest in having deter-
24 [1976] C.S. 1432, afy'd [1977] C.A. 308.
25 R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-34.
20 See section 708 of the Code. For the origins of the prerogative writs in criminal
law, see Ltourneau, L'historique des brefs de prerogative en droit anglais et canadien
(1975), 35 R. du B. 471.
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mined immediately, for the solution of a genuine problem, either his status or
any right, power or obligation which he may have under a contract, will or
any other written instrument, statutes, order in council, or resolution or by-
law of a municipal corporation, may, by motion of the court, ask for a dec-
laratory judgment in that regard."
The Qu6bec courts were quite reluctant to grant a declaratory judgment
and, over the years, they developed a restrictive interpretation of article 453.
They refused, for instance, to consider cases where the declaration might have
a curative, instead of preventive, effect. The Supreme Court strongly disap-
proved of this attitude in the recent case of Duquet v. Ste-Agathe-des-
Monts,27 and gave article 453 a broad interpretation, in conformity with
article 20. Since Duquet, the declaratory judgment has become almost as wide
in scope as the common law declaration. The case may thus have helped to
solve a delicate problem of Quebec law-the absence of the declaratory
action itself in the Code.
It seemed, at one time, that the declaratory action had no legal founda-
tion in Qu6bec, and there were some dicta of the Supreme Court to that
effect.2 8 However, declaratory relief had been granted by the Supreme Court
itself in the Alliance case.29 In 1976 Chief Justice Desch~nes of the Qu6bec
Superior Court indicated that the declaratory action was available to a plain-
tiff to attack the constitutionality of a Quebec statute.30 It appears, therefore,
that the declaratory action is available in Qu6bec, but, wherever possible, a
plaintiff should use the procedure set by article 453, as interpreted in the
Duquet case.
c) Homologation
Homologation is not, in itself, a judicial remedy. It is a procedure de-
signed to make an administrative decision executory against a party, in the
same way as a judgment of a court. This concept is drawn from French civil
procedure and appears to have no counterpart in common law jurisdictions.
The interesting thing about homologation is that it also provides for
some degree of judicial review of the decision submitted. Article 950 of the
Code reflects the dual-part administrative and part judicial-character of
the procedure of homologation:
The award of arbitrators can only be executed under the authority of a court
having jurisdiction, and upon motion for homologation, to have the party con-
demned to execute it.
The court before which such suit is brought may examine into any grounds
of nullity which affect the award or into any other questions of form which may
prevent its being homologated; it cannot, however, enquire into the merits of the
contestation.
2T [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1132.
28 Saumur v. A.G. Qui., [1964] S.C.R. 252, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 627; Jones v. Ga-
mache, [1969] S.C.R. 119, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 316.
29 Supra note 12.
30 Bureau Mitropolitain des Ecoles Protestantes de Montrial v. Ministre de I'Edu-
cation du Qudbec, [1976] C.S. 358. The Court of Appeal refused to consider an appeal
from that judgment, as the repeal of that statute had made the problem purely academic.
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Homologation may thus become the normal procedure used to contest the
legality of a decision, especially where there is no appeal or evocation to
the Superior Court.31
Homologation is not, however, confined to the Code of Civil Procedure;
it is included in various statutes. Jurisdiction to homologate is given not only
to the Superior Court, but sometimes to the Provincial Court as well; this may
cause some constitutional problems, as the Provincial Court is an inferior
court having no supervisory jurisdiction.
32
In some cases, the courts have considered homologation as a mere ad-
ministrative formality and have refused to examine the legality of the decision.
In other cases, the courts have shown themselves eager to use homologation
as a normal form of judicial review. 33 It is not easy to reconcile these two
trends. However, we may observe from the cases on homologation that, where
there is a statutory right of appeal or another recourse provided by law, a
court will not readily use homologation as an opportunity to review a deci-
sion. The court will suggest, instead, that the injured party attack the homol-
ogated decision in the normal way.34 The situation might be different where
there is no right of appeal and a privative clause prevents the injured party
from using the extraordinary remedies of evocation, mandamus and the like,
unless there is a strict jurisdictional question. In this case, the court might
review the decision, even if the law does not specify that it has the power
to do so, and does not indicate grounds for refusal of homologation.3 5
3. The Curious Case of the Direct Action in Nullity
Article 33 of the Code gives the Superior Court original jurisdiction in
matters of judicial review in Qu6bec. It states that:
Excepting the Court of Appeal, the courts within the jurisdiction of the Legisla-
ture of Quebec, and bodies politic and corporate within the province are subject
to the superintending and reforming power of the Superior Court in such manner
and form as by law provided, save in matters declared by law to be of the ex-
clusive competency of such courts or of any one of the latter, and save in cases
where the jurisdiction resulting from this article is excluded by some provision
of a general or special law.
31 See B6dard v. Trudel, [19751 R.P. 290 (C.S.).
32 Nevertheless, the Provincial Court has on several occasions refused to homolo-
gate illegal decisions, which amounts in practice to a declaration of nullity. See Massi
v. Breuvages Lucky One Lte, [1972] R.D.T. 10; and Corporation des maitres m~cani-
ciens en tuyauterie du Qug. v. Gabriel Dubreuil, [1974] R.L. 496.
n See the distinction in Ville de Montrdal v. Succession Charles Chafter, [1975]
C.S. 739. See, for instances of judicial review, Ville de Baie-Comeau v. Lgvesque, [1974]
C.A. 51; and Gagnon Electrique LtDe v. Fraternitg inter-provinciale des ouvriers en
dlectricitg, local 568, [1975] C.S. 283. This form of judicial control is not recent: Citj
de Montridal v. Childs (1889), 18 R.L. 268 (Qu6. S.C.). Also see Soci6ti Centrale d'Hypo-
thaques et de Logement v. Jobin, [1977] C.P. 148; and Climent v. Ville d'Acton Vale,
[1976] R.P. 92.
34 See Ville de Drummondville v. Madore et Fils Inc., [1974] R.P. 378 (C.S.);
D'Amours v. CMtg, [1966] R.P. 423 (C.P.); and T9l6cable de Qug. Inc. v. Bell Canada,
[1975] C.S. 1118.
35La Commisison des Accidents du Travail de Qu6. v. Paul Service Stores Ltd.,
[1961] B.R. 869; La Commission des Accidents du Travail de Qui. v. Forbes Dubj
Lumber, [1958] B.R. 573; Procureur Gdniral de Qui. v. Slanec (1933), 54 B.R. 230,
[1933] 2 D.L.R. 289, rev'g (1932), 70 C.S. 274, [1932] 3 D.L.R. 81.
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Amazingly enough, the Qu6bec courts have drawn from this statutory founda-
tion a new remedy having no counterpart in the common law-the direct
action in nullity. It differs from certiorari in that it is not a discretionary
remedy, and differs from the common law declaration in that its effect is to
quash a decision instead of declaring its nullity. Any interested person may
introduce an action in nullity within a thirty-year period. However, a decision
will be annulled only for want or excess of jurisdiction or for some other
grave illegality. A direct action in nullity will not usually be allowed when
another remedy is available. For instance, the Court of Appeal has held re-
peatedly that a person cannot use it in a situation where the conditions for
evocation are satisfied.36 The logic behind this attitude is to be found in the
words of article 31, "in such manner and form as by law provided," which
have been interpreted to mean that the direct action in nullity is the final-
not an alternative-recourse.
Thus, the direct action in nullity remains a common law remedy devel-
oped within the framework of a French-inspired Code of Civil Procedure, to
be used when the Code and the relevant statutes do not provide any other
effective recourse.8 7 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will
take such a restricted view of the scope of the direct action in nullity, espe-
cially after the stand it has taken in the Duquet case.A8
4. Other Statutory Remedies
Several Qu6bec statutes include a right of appeal to the Appeal, Superior
or Provincial Court from the decisions of various provincial agencies. This
right of appeal is often limited to questions of law and jurisdiction, and is
barely distinguishable from evocation. However, article 846 states that where
a right of appeal is conferred by law, no writ of evocation can be granted
unless there is a clear case of want or excess of jurisdiction. Sometimes, the
courts have even extended the word "appeal" to include administrative ap-
peal, even where the appeal is completely useless due to the nature of the
alleged illegality.3 9
36 Cit de Trois-Rivi~res v. Briare, [1974] C.A. 82; Sdminaire St-Franfois de Cap-
Rouge v. Yaccarini, [1973] C.A. 713. The same reasoning had been expressed in rela-
tion to a statutory remedy (the motion to quash) in Shannon Realties Ltd. v. Ville de
St. Michel, [1924] A.C. 185, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 119 (P.C.). Also see Societe Radio-Canada
v. Union des artistes, unreported, May 13, 1978 (Qu6. C.A.) for the proposition that
homologation under article 950 of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes the use of the
direct action in nullity. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has just decided that
the direct action in nullity was available as an alternative remedy to the writ of evoca-
tion. See Richard v. P.G. du Qua., December 12, 1978, as yet unreported.
37 See LeDain, supra note 10, at 794: The specific terms of article 33 "have fre-
quently been invoked by the courts to justify particular exercises of the supervisory
jurisdiction which they might have had greater difficulty in justifying if the provision
had not existed." While one may wonder at the somewhat specious foundation of the
direct action in nullity, "it is a little late in the day now to question the antecedents of a
recourse that has behind it a jurisprudence of almost one hundred years." (at 800).
88 Supra note 27. Doubts have been expressed as to the relevance of the Court of
Appeal's position in Robinson v. Commission de Police du Qua., [1977] C.S. 335. These
doubts were well founded. See note 36, supra.
39 Morin v. RAMQ, unreported, March 4, 1976 (Qu6. S.C.).
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In municipal law, the Cities and Towns Act,40 the Municipal Code and
some city charters (enacted as private acts) contain a special remedy-the
petition to quash. For instance, section 411 of the Cities and Towns Act pro-
vides that:
Any municipal elector may, by petition presented in his name, apply and obtain
on the ground of illegality, the quashing of any by-law or part of by-law of the
council, with costs against the municipality ....
Such an action may be instituted by any municipal elector within a three-
month period. After that time, only an interested person-that is, one who is
specially affected by the by-law-may attack it by taking a direct action in
nullity, but he will have to allege serious grounds of illegality, whereas mere
procedural irregularities may render a by-law void by means of the action to
quash.
Statutory provisions stipulated that actions to quash had to be introduced
before the Provincial Court. For constitutional reasons, the Superior Court
now has de facto jurisdiction over such actions. 41 As a result, the action to
quash, which used to constitute a speedy remedy due to the lighter load of
cases in the Provincial Court, is now less expeditious.
This completes the arsenal of judicial remedies available before the Su-
perior Court to attack the validity of an administrative decision.4 The com-
plexity of these recourses and the uncertainty regarding their use led the
Qu6bec government to set up a "Comit6 sur la r6vision judiciaire" in 1976.
This Committee presented its report to the Department of Justice in Decem-
ber, 1976. However, it was not until very recently that the report was pub-
licized and used as a basis for forthcoming legislation.
C. Proposals of the "Comitg sur la rivision judiciaire"
The mandate of the Committee was to unify the prerogative writs and
other remedies "pr6vus au Code de proc6dure civile et dans les lois sp6ciales"
dealing with control over the legality of administrative decisions. Accordingly,
the Committee has suggested the adoption of a new "recours en surveillance
judiciaire," and has recommended a simplified procedure for applications to
review. We will concentrate on the main aspects of the proposed remedy.
The Committee's main recommendation is that a new "recours en sur-
veillance judiciaire" be set up as the only remedy in the Code to be used in
reviewing the legality of a decision emanating from a public authority. It will
provide different kinds of relief, such as an order to act or a prohibition to
act, the annulment of a decision or the granting of a declaration.
The grounds of illegality which can be alleged by a claimant are enu-
merated in an exhaustive list that purports to codify the existing grounds for
40 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 193.
41 Courcy v. Ville de Longueuil, [1976] C.S. 867; Langelier v. Corporation Mun.
de St-Frangois de Pabos, [1976] C.S. 1284. The constitutional problem will be explained
later.
42 Also see Dussault, supra note 4, at 983-1217.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
review. While the list is limitative, it contains headings such as "violation de
la loi de nature & entraimer une injustice flagrante," which may include some
grounds of illegality that are not otherwise mentioned in the enumeration (for
instance, the lack of evidence to support a decision affecting rights, and the
duty to act fairly). The proposed remedy would be used within a reasonable
time and after the claimant had exhausted any "useful" right of appeal or
reconsideration that might be available to him. It would replace entirely the
writs of evocation and mandamus, as well as the direct action in nullity. It
would also assume some aspects of injunction and the declaratory judgment,
but would leave quo warranto intact. The writ of habeas corpus would re-
main, but problems of legality arising out of habeas corpus proceedings would
be adjudicated under the new recourse.
To determine whether a decision or process is reviewable under the new
remedy, the courts would have to use the "public vs. private" test. Thus,
proceedings of a private nature would still be reviewable under the present
law of remedies. Administrative adjudication by public authorities and dele-
gated legislation would be reviewed only by way of the new "recours en sur-
veillance judiciaire." One might argue that the "public vs. private" test is not
ideal and might create the same sort of difficulties that the courts have brought
up with article 846, that is, the "quasi-judicial vs. administrative" test. It is
true that some provisions of the Code, especially article 844 (mandamus),
already refer to such a distinction, but the case law under article 844 is rather
unclear.
The word "decision" is not really defined in the Committee's draft bill.
It is said that: "Le terme 'd6cision' d6signe 6galement un statut, un arr~t6
en conseil, un rglement ou une r6solution."
In practice, then, the scope of the new remedy is left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the courts. The use of a formula such as "exercise, refusal to exer-
cise or proposed or purported exercise by any person of a statutory power or
prerogative" may have been more helpful.
The effect of the proposed recourse on existing judicial remedies is not
clear. To what extent will they be repealed or modified? What will happen to
the other common law and statutory remedies (homologation, declaration,
appeal, petition to quash in municipal law, etc.) not directly affected by the
reform?
It seems that the propositions set forward by the Committee in its Draft
Bill, while settling old problems, will create new ones. More research on the
existing remedies and a more global view of the law of judicial review would
have been expected from the Committee, but its mandate was limited and the
Committee itself chose to interpret it very restrictively.
D. Some Restrictions on Judicial Review
The tendency of Quebec legislation, especially in the last thirty years or
so, has been to deprive, or attempt to deprive, the Superior Court of part of
its supervisory jurisdiction. This was done by setting up privative clauses or
by transferring aspects of supervisory jurisdiction to inferior tribunals.
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1. Negative Restrictions: Privative Clauses
Qu6bec statutes conferring discretionary powers almost invariably in-
clude privative clauses, their purpose being to ensure the finality of adminis-
trative adjudication.43 The standard privative clause will state that "no extra-
ordinary recourse contemplated in articles 834 to 850 of the Code of Civil
Procedure shall be exercised and no injunction granted against the persons
... acting in their official capacities."
The reaction of the courts in Qu6bee,44 and of the Supreme Court of
Canada,45 has been to consider that these clauses did not prohibit judicial
review but only restricted it to jurisdictional questions. However, "jurisdic-
tion" is a bird of many colours and the courts may, in their discretion, include
as affecting jurisdiction various types of errors of law, as well as violations
of the rules of natural justice. The Qu6bec courts have had the same attitude
towards clauses that prescribe a particular remedy but set a short time limit
for its exercise. Such provisions have been considered inoperative in cases of
excess of jurisdiction.4
The reaction of the Qu6bec courts generally has been to interpret quite
liberally their supervisory jurisdiction in situations where they wished to
intervene. Consequently, the use of the privative clause is of no great impor-
tance today, except for the problems of errors within or affecting jurisdiction
and lack of evidence. The "Comit6 sur la r6vision judiciaire" has proposed
that the new "recours en r6vision judiciaire" be exercised notwithstanding
these clauses.
47
2. Positive Restrictions: Inferior Tribunals with
Supervisory Jurisdiction
Over the years, the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court (formerly the
Magistrate's Court) was enlarged to include some aspects of municipal affairs.
More recently, the Court has been used as a tribunal for appeals from the
decisions of several government agencies.
43 See Dussault, supra note 4, at 1147-68 for a "tour d'horizon" on privative
clauses in Qu6bec.
44 Lalonde Automobile Ltie v. Naylor, [1974] C.A. 489, [1974] R.P. 372; Soccio
v. Rdgie des Alcools du Qu6., [1972] C.A. 283; Ass'n Catholique des Enseignants de
rEstrie v. Commission des Ecoles Catholiques de Sherbrooke, [1970] C.A. 369.
45 L'Alliance des professeurs catholiques de Montrial v. LRB, supra note 12;
Commission des Relations de Travail du Qua. v. Cimon Ltie, [1971] S.C.R. 981.
46 Club de courses Jacques-Cartier Inc. v. Cossette, [1975] C.S. 912; Jolicoeur v.
Citj de Quibec, [1974] C.A. 293. Compare with Smith v. East Elloe Rural Dist. Coun-
cil, [1956] A.C. 736.
4 7 The Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, S.Q. 1975, c. 6, might affect
future privative clauses, as far as natural justice is concerned. Section 23 of the Charter
states that:
Every person has a right to a full and equal, public and fair hearing by an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions or of the merits of any charge brought against him.
The word "tribunal" is said to include an "inquiry commission" (section 56(1)). By
section 52, section 23 is made to "prevail over any provision of any subsequent act
which may be inconsistent therewith unless such act expressly states that it applies
despite the Charter."
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In 1964 the Supreme Court held that the Provincial Court itself was
constitutional, even if its jurisdiction in civil matters had been enlarged to
include actions of up to $3,000. But the Supreme Court did not, however,
rule on other spheres of competence of the Provincial Court.48
In 1972 the well-known case of Sdminaire de Chicoutimi v. Citg de
Chicoutimi4 9 decided that it was ultra vires the powers of the Qu6bec legisla-
ture to give the Provincial Court jurisdiction over actions to quash municipal
by-laws, as such jurisdiction belonged to a superior court in 1867. The case
set up a chain reaction and, since then, some jurisdictions of the Court-in
quo warranto proceedings involving local officials, for instance-were re-
turned de facto, if not de jure, to the Superior Court.50
The attempt of the Qu6bec legislature to set up a parallel supervisory
jurisdiction by using the Provincial Court (the members of which are nomi-
nated and paid by the Qu6bec government) was thus foiled. There remains
the appellate side of the Provincial Court's jurisdiction. Uncertainty still re-
mains as to whether a provision creating an appeal on questions of law, while
prohibiting other remedies, is ultra vires.
Another trend of Qu6bec legislation in recent years has been towards the
creation of administrative appeal tribunals, which have been set up to hear
appeals on questions of law and fact from decisions of administrative agen-
cies. For instance, the Professions Tribunal was created to supervise the vari-
ous Disciplinary Councils set up under the Professional Code.r1 The Municipal
Commission supervises decisions made by the Director of Environmental Pro-
tection, while the Social Affairs Commission is a large tribunal that hears
appeals from decisions by more than half a dozen agencies, such as the Auto-
mobile Insurance Board, the Rents Tribunal and the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Board. There have been suggestions as to the creation of an Adminis-
tration Court to serve as a court of final appeal for administrative boards, but
the existence of section 96 of the B.N.A. Act prevents the creation of such
a Court.
Meanwhile, the constitutionality of the appeal tribunal scheme is being
put to the test. It is admitted that the jurisdiction of these tribunals included
matters that were left to private initiative in 1867 and therefore were not part
of the Superior Court's jurisdiction, but is the appeal jurisdiction itself not
analogous to the traditional supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior Court?
This test was applied in the recent Supreme Court case of Attorney Gen-
eral of Quibec v. FarrahY2 The Transport Tribunal was created in 1972.Uo
Its main jurisdiction is to hear appeals from the Transport Commission re-
48 Renvoi touchant la constitutionnalitg de la lo6 concernant la juridiction de la
cour de magistrat, [1965] S.C.R. 772.
49 [1973] S.C.R. 681, 27 D.L.R. (3d) 356.
50 Parker v. Betnesky, [1976] C.P. 279.
51 S.Q. 1973, e .43.
52 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638, 86 D.L.R. (3d) 161.
53 Transport Act, S.Q. 1972, c. 55, s. 52.
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garding rates and licences. Section 58 of the Act refers to the appellate juris-
diction as follows:
The Transport Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other
court, to hear and dispose of:
a) in appeal, on any question of law, any decision of the Commission which
terminates a matter;
b) in appeal, decisions of the Commission under section 30;
c) any matter, by evocation, when the Commission has omitted or neglected to
render its decisions within six months following the making of the application.
Only paragraph (a) of section 58 was attacked for unconstitutionality.
The Court began its reasoning by admitting that it was open to a prov-
ince "to establish an administrative tribunal of appeal as part of a valid regu-
latory statute and to invest such a tribunal with power to make decisions on
questions of law in the course of exercising an appellate authority over deci-
sions of the primary agency."' 54 The Supreme Court also admitted that "a
provincial legislature is therefore competent to reduce the scope of the super-
visory power of a superior court by precluding the review by that court of
the decisions of an inferior tribunal which, while taken within jurisdiction are,
however, tainted with "illegality" (i.e., error of law on the face of the record),
and might otherwise be quashed on certiorari."55 Chief Justice Laskin went
even further than Mr. Justice Pratte, who wrote the majority opinion. Accord-
ing to him, "the case law supports an even wider authority in this respect,
authority to vest unreviewable power to determine all questions of law which
arise in the course of the exercise of the provincial tribunal's statutory
functions." 56
However, the Court read section 58(a) together with the privative
clauses contained in other sections of the Act. The Court was unanimous in
finding that the exclusionary character of section 58(a) was more than a
standard privative clause. It was an attempt "to constitute the Transport
Tribunal as the final court of appeal of Qu6bec in matters within s. 58(a),
and to oust the superintending and reforming authority of the Superior
Court.157 It was thus held unanimously by the Court that section 58 (a) was
ultra vires; consequently, the law established in the Sdminaire de Chicoutimi
case was extended to include some appeal functions as well. The Court did
not, however, consider the fact that the Transport Tribunal had the power
either to modify decisions of the Transport Commission, or to put them aside
and substitute its own decisions. These powers are not tantamount to judicial
review. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Board had exclusive appellate
jurisdiction was enough for the Court.
54 A. G. Qug. v. Farrah, supra note 52, at 642 (S.C.R.), 164 (D.L.R.) per Laskin
C.J.C.
GG Id. at 655 (S.C.R.), 178 (D.L.R.) per Pratte J.
56 1d. at 643 (S.C.R.), 165 (D.L.R.).
57 Id. at 647 (S.C.R.), 168 (D.L.R.) per Laskin CJ.C. The Court refused to inter-
pret section 58(a) as just another privative clause. Mr. Justice Pigeon, who wrote a
separate opinion, but was in agreement with Mr. Justice Pratte, said on this point at
657 (S.C.R.), 169 (D.L.R.): "I see no reason to depart from the literal meaning of
this legislation, which is perfectly clear."
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The Farrah case is not the only instance where an appeal tribunal has
been found to be ultra vires. However, other cases will soon come up before
the Court of Appeal, and only then will the real impact of this decision on
analogous statutory schemes be felt.58 Under the present constitutional ar-
rangement, there will always be a measure of uncertainty as to the legality
of administrative appeal tribunals. It is only at the Superior Court level that
one can seriously consider the creation of an administrative court, or, at least,
of an administrative division of the Superior Court.
3. Is a Total Exclusion of the Superior Court's
Supervisory Jurisdiction Possible?
We have seen that the courts have repeatedly ignored privative clauses
to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals. Attempts to
create provincially controlled supervisory tribunals have also failed, due to
section 96 of the B.N.A. Act. What would happen, though, if a provincial
legislature did adopt a total privative clause, excluding all forms of judicial
control?
In Three Rivers Boatman, the Supreme Court held that a province could
not usurp the Superior Court's jurisdiction over federal bodies, as this would
amount to interference with federal jurisdiction.59 Since the creation of the
Federal Court, such power has been, but for minor exceptions, transferred to
the new Court. Would a province have jurisdiction to preclude judicial review
of the decisions of its own departments and boards, however? Until recently,
such a question would have been considered purely theoretical. It is true that
in R. ex rel. Sewell v. Morrell,60 the Ontario High Court had stated that it
could not review a decision from a War Mobilization Board, as the decisions
of such boards (created under War Measures Act Regulation) were deemed
to be legal even in cases of "want or excess of jurisdiction,"61 but this was a
"war case" and could be dismissed as such. The accepted theory was more
attuned to the famous dictum of Chief Justice Rinfret in the Alliance case,
where he had written:
Le l6gislateur, m~me s'il le voulait, ne pourrait d6clarer l'absurdit6 qu'un tribunal
qui agit sans juridiction peut 8tre immunis6 contre l'application du bref de prohi-
58 The Municipal Commission was held to be ultra vires when it heard an appeal
from the dismissal of a municipal manager in Ldvis v. Ouellet, not yet reported, Feb-
ruary 13, 1978 (Qu6. C.S.). Also see two contradictory judgments concerning the
Professional Tribunals: Choquette v. Comitd de discipline du Barreau, not yet reported,
December 15, 1977 (Qu6. C.S.); and Crevier v. Aubry, [1977] C.S. 324.
59 The Federal Parliament may, of course, affect that jurisdiction. See Pringle v.
Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28.
6O [1944] 3 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. H.C.).
61 Section 9(5) of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations,
C.W.O.R./42-10924, reads as follows:
No proceeding authorized or pending before a Board and no decision of a Board
shall, by means of an injunction, prohibition, mandamus, certiorari, habeas cor-
pus or other process, issuing out of court, be enjoined, restrained, stayed, re-
moved or subjected to review or consideration on any ground whether arising
out of alleged absence of jurisdiction in a Board, nullity, defect or irregularity
of the proceedings or any other cause whatsoever, nor shall any such proceedings
or decision be questioned, reviewed or reconsidered in any court.
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bition. Sa decision est nulle et aucun texte d'un statut ne pent lui donner de la va-
lidit6 on d6cider que, malgr6 sa nullit6, cette d6cision devrait quand meme 6tre
reconnue comme valide et etre ex6cutoire.
62
The problem with such high-sounding words is that they have no solid con-
stitutional foundation. There is no enshrinement of judicial review in the
B.N.A. Act. Instead, we have imported from the English public law the prin-
ciple of parliamentary sovereignty which, in Canada, is limited only by the
sharing of jurisdictions between federal and provincial parliaments. In Eng-
land, administrative action may be made immune to judicial review.
63
This approach surfaced in Canada with the Woodward case.64 The late
Mr. Woodward had, by his will, left all the residue of his estate to the
"Woodward Foundation." The foundation was created for charitable objects
only. However, the Minister of Finance of British Columbia imposed a heavy
succession duty on the estate. The assessment was made without notice to the
executors, who applied for a writ of certiorari, alleging a violation of natural
justice.
The Succession Duty Act 5 of British Columbia provided that the Min-
ister could determine, in his absolute discretion, "whether any purpose or
organization is a religious, charitable or educational purpose or organiza-
tion."66 The Act also contained a right of appeal to the Minister.6 7 In this
case, an appeal was made to the Minister, who refused to consider it.
To counter the allegation of the plaintiff, the Minister relied on an
amendment to the Succession Duty Act. The purpose of the amendment was
to ensure that the Minister's determination as to the status of a "purpose or
an organization" was unreviewable:
[Tihe determination of the Minister is final, conclusive and binding on all persons
and ... is not open to appeal, question or review in any Court, and any determi-
nation of the Minister made under this subsection is hereby ratified and confirmed
and is binding on all persons.
68
The modifying Act came into force on the first day of April, 1970. How-
ever, it contained very peculiar provisions as to the amendment itself. First,
the amendment ratifying the Minister's determination was not applicable in
respect of estates in which the death of the deceased had occurred after the
first day of April, 1970, but was "deemed to have come into force on the
first day of April, 1968, and is retroactive to the extent necessary to give full
force and effect to the provision it amends on or after that date, and applies
62 Supra note 12, at 155 (S.C.R.), 175 (D.L.R.).
63 See Lemieux and Vallires, supra note 8. Also see Hogg, Is Judicial Review of
Administrative Action Guaranteed by the I.N.A. Act? (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 716;
Farrel v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., [1962] S.C.R. 48 at 52, 31 D.L.R. (2d) 177 at 180-81
per Judson J.; and Dussault, supra note 4, at 1137-47.
64 Woodward v. Minister of Fin., [1973] S.C.R. 120, 27 D.L.R. (3d) 608, [1972]
C.T.C. 385.
05 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 372, as am. by S.B.C. 1963, c. 44, and by S.B.C. 1970, c. 45.
66R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 372, s. 5(2), as am. by S.B.C. 1963, c. 44, s. 5.
67 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 372, s. 43, as am. by S.B.C. 1963, c. 44, s. 22.
68 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 372, s. 5(2), as am. by S.B.C. 1970, c. 45, s. 5.
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to property passing on the death of a person dying on, from, and after that
date."6' 9 This meant that:
(a) all the decisions of the Minister already made in relation to successions
where the death of the deceased had occurred between April 1, 1968
and April 1, 1970 were ratified retroactively; and
(b) decisions that had not yet been made by the Minister with regard to such
estates were also ratified in advance.
Retroactive legislation is not new. A parliament may adopt retroactive
measures and, indeed, there have been many instances where provisions have
been enacted so as to correct flagrant administrative illegalities. To extend
that protection to administrative decisions yet to be taken, however, is an
altogether different matter, and the impact on respect for the rule of law and
for judicial review is of great magnitude.
The Supreme Court of Canada had to interpret the amendment and
evaluate whether the decision concerning the Woodward Estate, to which the
amendment applied, was still reviewable for excess of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice
Martland, who wrote the unanimous judgment of the Court, held that the
decision was indeed illegal, as it contravened the audi alteram partem rule.
He went on to state that this constituted an excess of jurisdiction and that no
privative clause could prevent the decision from being reviewed by the court.70
However, he held that, in this case, the amendment had prohibited any inter-
vention by the courts:
In my opinion the Legislature intended to ratify, confirm and make binding any
determination of the Minister, under s. 5(2), which, otherwise, would have been
invalid.
It is not the function of this Court to consider the policy of legislation validly
enacted. Such legislation must be enforced in accordance with its terms.71
Some contrary views had been expressed by the Supreme and Appeal
Court of British Columbia. Mr. Justice Monroe of the B.C. Supreme Court
had held that:
Mhe Legislature could not ratify or confirm a determination that was not then
in existence any more than it could ratify, confirm or make binding a determina-
tion which was a nullity at law. A determination made, as this one was, in breach
of the principles of natural justice, is void.72
The British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed Mr. Justice Monroe's judg-
ment two to one. The majority opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
However, the dissenting member found it "difficult to accept the fact that the
Legislature confided a statutory authority to the Minister subject to the use
of his discretion, which could only be exercised judicially and which had to
conform with the tenets of natural justice, and then by another clause give
retroactive validity to a purported determination made in disregard of or in
violation of the principles of natural justice and arbitrarily, and otherwise
69 S.B.C. 1970, c. 45, s. 12.
7OSupra note 64, at 128-29 (S.C.R.), 615-16 (D.L.R.), 389-90 (C.T.C.).
71Id. at 130 (S.C.R.), 616-17 (D.L.R.), 390 (C.T.C.).
72 Re Woodward Estate (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 583 at 589, [1970] C.T.C. 444 at
450 (B.C.S.C.).
(VOL. 17, NO. I
Supervisory Judicial Control
protect that illegal decision from the supervisory area of a superior court by
making it final, binding and conclusive on everybody and through the medium
of a privative clause."'73 Mr. Justice Branca suspected that the amendment was
an ad hominem clause "couched in its language to rescue the determination
of the Minister made on May 1, 1969."' 4
The appellant, the Woodward Estate, had relied heavily on the Anisminic
case, in which the House of Lords had held that a "decision" made in viola-
tion of the rules of natural justice was no decision at all and could be reviewed,
despite a clause that said that: "The determination by the Commission of any
application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in
any court of law."'75 The Supreme Court, however, chose not to give such a
"liberal" interpretation to the amendment. It held that such an interpretation
"would deprive the latter words of section 5(2) of any effect whatever. It would
mean that the ratification provision could only apply to a determination made
within the Minister's jurisdiction and after observing the rules of natural
justice. But such a determination requires no ratification or confirmation."
7 6
The appellant also argued that if the superior courts were precluded
from reviewing the Minister's determinations under section 5(2), then the
Minister would be acting ultra vires, as he would fulfil a function similar to
that of a Superior Court under section 96 of the B.N.A. Act. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument without any comment whatsoever and, by so do-
ing, eliminated the last obstacle in the path of a statutory scheme aimed at the
eradication of judicial review.77
The Woodward Estate case goes a long way towards ensuring that parlia-
mentary sovereignty supersedes judicial review. In a federal state such as
Canada, the only restriction on unimpaired parliamentary sovereignty must be
found in the B.N.A. Act itself; thus, the control of the constitutionality of a
provincial statute could not be affected by a provision similar to section 5(2)
of the Succession Duty Act of British Columbia, as this would allow a prov-
ince to adopt ultra vires legislation without being checked judicially. Non-
intervention by the courts in such situations would constitute a step towards
the break-up of the federation, and there are indications that the Supreme
Court would, in fact, intervene.
73
73Minister of Fin. V. Woodward (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 681 at 722, [1971] C.T.C.
341 at 382 per Branca J.A.
74 Id. at 730 (D.L.R.), 390 (C.T.C.).
75 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Comp. Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, [1969] 2 All E.R.
208.
76 Supra note 64, at 129-30 (S.C.R.), 616 (D.L.R.), 390 (C.T.C.).
77 The argument was quite plausible and should have been answered by the Court.
See Re Schepull and Bekeschus, [1954] O.R. 67, [1954] 2 D.L.R. 5 (H.C.), where an
Ontario statute was held ultra vires in part because it conferred on a Minister a supe-
rior court function. For a discussion about the impact of the Woodward case, see PNpin,
Droit Administratif, [1974] R. du B. 90 and 532. For a contrary view, see Cloutier et
al., Droit Administratif, [1974] R. du B. 244.
78 See Amax Potash Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, 71 D.L.R. (3d) 1,
especially at 590-91 (S.C.R.), 10-11 (D.L.R.) per Dickson J. Also see Hogg, supra
note 63, at 720.
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III. THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE
FEDERAL COURT IN QUEBEC
The adoption of the Federal Court Act has meant the loss of the super-
visory jurisdiction of the superior courts to the new court. Judicial review
being a corollary to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the Parliament
of Canada was able to take that "inherent" jurisdiction away from the pro-
vincial courts, purportedly to provide uniformity in the law relating to the
federal government and to insure a speedier and more informed supervisory
control.
The Federal Court is, however, a court of restricted jurisdiction.7 9 It
has only the powers that devolve upon it expressly by federal statute. In case
of doubt or silence, the general rules of interpretation favour the provincial
superior courts, as courts of original common law jurisdiction.8 0 That prin-
ciple of interpretation is to be kept in mind in the discussion that follows.
A. The "Federal" Agencies
Section 2 of the Federal Court Act attempts to define the various persons
or bodies that are to be supervised by the Court. In order to determine
whether a person or board is a "federal" agency, one must use the following
test:
(1) the person or body must act (or purport to act) under a federal
statute; and
(2) be created (or pretend to be) by a federal statute or be a persona
designata under a federal statute.
The first condition has not presented serious difficulties. It means, in practice,
that a federal body granted additional jurisdiction by a provincial statute is
supervised, while acting in that capacity, by a provincial superior court.81 The
second condition has had some awkward consequences. The concept of the
persona designata means that where a statute designates a person or member
of a court as the holder of an administrative power (as opposed to a juris-
diction conferred to a board or a court as such), that person becomes a fed-
eral agency for the purpose of judicial review, even if there is no control by
the federal government over the nomination of such persons or over their
actions.8 2 Thus, superior court judges and even Qu6bec police officers have
79 It is entirely statutory. See Union Oil of Canada v. The Queen, [1976] 1 F.C. 74,
72 D.L.R. (3d) 81 (F.C.A.); and Puerto Rico v. Hernandez, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 228,
(1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 549, 14 C.C.C. (2d) 209, where Pigeon 3. stated at 233
(S.C.R.), 553 (D.L.R.), 213 (C.C.C.) that "the Federal Court has jurisdiction only
where provided by the Act or by any other federal Act ...."
80 Cf. Board v. Board, [1919] A.C. 956, 48 D.L.R. 13 (P.C.), quoted in Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 116. See Beauvais v.
Delisle, [1977] 1 F.C. 622 (F.C.T.D.).
81 Commission d'appel des pensions v. Matte, [1974] CA. 252.
82 For a more general discussion of the concept of persona designata under section
2(g), see Lemieux and Valli~res, La compdtence de la Cour fdrale comme organisme
bidivisionnel de contr~le judiciare (1976), 17 C. de D. 379 at 385-90.
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been deemed to be a "federal board" under section 2.83 There is still some
uncertainty as to the status of judges under the Indian Act, 4 and the situation
is rather complex in the field of extradition.85 This dual system of jurisdiction
may result in contradictory judgments from the Federal and Provincial Courts
as to the interpretation of section 2.86
B. Remedies
Under the Federal Court Act, the following steps have to be taken by a
claimant. He must first make sure that there is a right of appeal on a question
of law, as section 29 requires that this recourse be used instead of, or before,
the supervisory remedies.8 7 If there is no such right of appeal, the claimant
must make an "application to review" under section 28 of the Act8 8 if he meets
all the conditions. The Federal Court of Appeal will hear his application, as
it has no discretion to refuse to do so. 9 Privative clauses are also of no avail,
especially if they were passed before the adoption of the Act,90 since section
28 contains a "notwithstanding any other Act" clause. The Court of Appeal
will not be able to grant an interlocutory injunction allowing for a stay of
proceedings, and it now appears that the Trial Division cannot grant an in-
junction for the same purpose. 91
The Court of Appeal is not, however, the true holder of the supervisory
jurisdiction, since that jurisdiction was given by section 18 to the Trial Divi-
sion of the Court. Consequently, the courts have interpreted section 28 rather
restrictively, and have defined several conditions for the admissibility of an
application to review under that section. First, the decision attacked must be
8 3 See Walker v. Gagnon, [1976] 2 F.C. 155, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 177 (F.C.T.D.). But
a provincial Transport Board is not a "federal" agency when it deals with interprovin-
cial transport applications, since it is not designated as such and, therefore, is not a
persona designata. See Canadian Pacific Transp. Co. v. Highway Traffic Bd., [1976] 5
W.W.R. 541, [1976] C.T.C. 337; and Re Bicknell Freighters Ltd. and Highway Trans-
port Bd. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (Man. CA.). Also see, for a provincial court,
Lees v. The Queen, [1974] 1 F.C. 605, 46 D.L.R. (3d) 603 (F.C.T.D.).
84 See A.G. Can. v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481; Two-Axe v.
Iroquois Band Council, unreported, December 9, 1977 (Que. S.C.).
85 See Vardy v. Scott, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 293, 66 D.L.R. (3d) 431, 28 C.C.C. (2d) 164.
86 See Bddard v. Isaac, [1972] 2 O.R. 391 at 395-96, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 551 at 555-
56 per Osler J. (H.C.).
87 Cf. Mojica v. MMI, [1977] 1 F.C. 458 (F.C.A.); and John Graham and Co. v.
CRTC, [1976] 2 F.C. 82 (F.C.A.).
88 If the deciison is reviewable under section 28, he need not use his right to an
administrative appeal where such a right exists. Instead, he may go directly to the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal.
89 The situation here is different from that which prevails with prerogative writs,
injunctions and declarations at common law.
90 Cf. MNR v. MacDonald, [1977] 2 F.C. 189, 77 D.T.C. 5124 (F.C.A.); and
MNR v. Caughnawaga Indian Band, [1977] 2 F.C. 269, [1977] C.T.C. 49 (F.C.A.), for
a discussion of the effect of posterior privative clauses.
91 Fisher v. The Queen, [1978] 1 F.C. 300 (F.C.T.D.).
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either final or capable of causing irreparable harm to the claimant 2 If the
decision is purely interlocutory, the only recourse will be by way of prohibi-
tion or injunction under section 18. 93 Second, the decision must be statutorily
submitted to a quasi-judicial process. This second condition is the conse-
quence of recent Superior Court decisions. The Federal Court itself was
tempted, at first, to enlarge the scope of section 28 to include situations in
which the common law had held that the adjudicator had a "duty to act fair-
ly" even if there was no clear statutory provision requiring that a notice or a
hearing be given to the persons involved.94 The Supreme Court, however, has
held that:
(1) the mere fact that the rights of the claimant are affected is not
enough; there must be a duty to act judicially; and
(2) that duty is to be found in a statute or a regulation adopted under
a statute but not in the common law or even in directives or rules
of practice. 95
These restrictions have helped to revitalize the jurisdiction of the Trial
Division under section 18. That section transferred from the provincial courts
and gave to the Trial Division exclusive jurisdiction over mandamus, quo
warranto, prohibition, certiorari, declaration, and other forms of relief of the
same nature. While mandamus, prohibition and injunction were granted from
the bench, there were doubts as to the true extent of the Trial Division's juris-
diction over declaration and certiorari, except as a complement to other reme-
dies, as these were largely superseded by section 28, which had priority over
section 18. In its decisions in Hardayal,90 Howarth" and Martineau,9" the
Supreme Court indicated that section 18 would be more appropriate than
section 28 in situations where the claimant was arguing that he had to be
treated "fairly and impartially" in the absence of a quasi-judicial process in
the statute being applied.
The Federal Court has respected the new guidelines and has been more
eager to grant declarations against purely administrative decisions. The status
of certiorari is still in doubt, however. 9
92 See B.C. Packers Ltd. v. CLRB, [1973] P.C. 1194 (F.C.A.); A.G. Can. v.
Cylien, [1973] F.C. 1166 (F.C.A.); and In re Anti-Dumping Act, [1974] F.C. 22
(F.C.A.). It must have some normative character and not merely be a recommendation.
See Lingley v. Board of Review, [1976] 1 F.C. 98, 62 D.L.RL (3d) 187, 25 C.CC. (2d)
81 (F.CA.).
93 B.C. Packers Ltd. v. CLRB, [1974] 2 F.C. 913, 50 D.L.R. (3d) 602 (F.C.T.D.),
afd [1976] 1 F.C. 375 (F.C.A.).
94 See Lazarov v. Secretary of State, [1973] F.C. 927, 39 D.L.R. (3d) 738 (F.C.A.);
and Blais v. Basford, [1972] F.C. 151 (F.C.A.).
95 Martineau v. Matsqui Inst., supra note 17. But see Magrath v. The Queen, [1978]
2 F.C. 232, 38 C.C.C. (2d) 67 (F.C.T.D.). Also see Inuit Tapirasat of Can. v. Leger,
unreported, November 17, 1978 (F.C.A.).
96 MMI v. Hardayal, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 470, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 465.
97 Howarth v. National Pdrole Bd., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 453, (1974) 50 D.L.R. (3d)
349, 18 C.C.C. (2d) 385.
98 Supra note 17.
99 In Matsqui Inst. v. Martineau (No. 2), [1978] 2 F.C. 637, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 325
(F.C.A.), a writ of certiorari was quashed because the decision was not quasi-judicial.
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The writ of habeas corpus was left outside the scope of section 18. The
Federal Court has indicated that it did not have jurisdiction to grant a writ of
habeas corpus' o or a declaration to the same effect.' 0 Since it was not clearly
given to the Federal Court, the jurisdiction to grant that remedy has been
held (and rightly so) to be left to the provincial superior courts.' o2 However,
that exception has created some problems. In at least one instance, 10 3 there
have been contradictory judgments by the Ontario High Court and the Fed-
eral Court as to the interpretation of a federal statute. Moreover, some pro-
vincial courts' 04 have held that they had jurisdiction to grant a certiorari in
aid as incidental to a writ of habeas corpus, while the Qu6bec Court of Ap-
peal has affirmed that the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction in that
respect. 05
The Superior Court may have some other residual jurisdiction over the
Federal agencies. For instance, the remedies peculiar to Qu6bec, such as the
direct action in nullity, are not enumerated under section 18. Are these reme-
dies "relief of the nature contemplated" by section 18?106
A more certain exception is the declaration of unconstitutionality of a
federal statute. It would again be contrary to the basic principle of federalism
that the Federal Parliament might unilaterally effect judicial review of its
legislation. This rather theoretical argument is reinforced by the restrictive
interpretation given to section 101 of the B.N.A. Act in the McNamara Con-
struction case.10 7 In fact, the B.N.A. Act itself is not a "law of Canada," and
is therefore outside the scope of the Federal Court, unless the constitutional
question arises only incidentally.
08
C. Proposals of the Law Reform Commission
In its Working Paper No. 18, the Law Reform Commission of Canada
has proposed some modifications to judicial review of federal agencies. Some
100 Sadique v. MMI, [1974] F.C. 719, 46 D.L.R. (3d) 131 (F.C.T.D.).
101 Cavanaugh v. Commissioner of Penitentiaries, [1974] 1 F.C. 515 (F.C.T.D.);
Johns v. Commissioner of Penitentiaries, [1974] 1 F.C. 545 (F.C.T.D.).
102 In re Augustin et M.M.D.I., [1976] C.A. 478.
103 Ex parte Spice (1975), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 141 (Ont. H.C.).
104 Re Virginia and Cohen (No. 2), [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 262, 14 C.C.C. (2d) 174
(H.C.); Ex parte Marcotte (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 441 (Ont. H.C.).
105 Cotroni v. Gouverneur de la prison de Montrdal, [1974] C.A. 313. Also see
Schirm v. Directeur de l'institution Archambault, [1977] C.S. 428.
100 In Puerto Rico v. Hernandez, supra note 79, at 233 (S.C.R.), 553 (D.L.R.), 213
(C.C.C.), Pigeon J. stated that:
[U]nder the first heading, s. 18 confers to the Trial Division of the Federal Court
supervisory jurisdiction over "any federal board, commission or other tribunal".
The language used is clearly intended to transfer this jurisdiction entirely from
the superior courts of the Provinces to the Federal Court.
107 McNamara Construction v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, 75 D.L.R. (3d)
273. Also see Qudbec North Shore Paper Co. v. C.P., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, 71 D.L.R.
(3d) 111. These cases will make the provincial courts less reticent to deal with such
declarations. See Denison Mines Ltd. v. A.G. Can., [1973] 1 O.R. 797, 32 D.L.R. (3d)
419 (H.C.).
108 See Thorson v. A.G. Can., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, 43 D.L.R .(3d) 1. Cf. Gibson,
Comment (1976), 54 Can. 1B. Rev. 372.
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of these propositions are of great importance and should be subjected to
scrutiny before being implemented. The proposal of a new "reform" only
seven years after the creation of the Federal Court is a questionable endeav-
our, unless such changes eliminate present problems at a single stroke, which
is debatable.
1. Interaction with Provincial Courts' 09
The Law Reform Commission has apparently taken for granted that the
Federal Court has established its usefulness and should be maintained. The
evidence in support of such an assumption seems rather weak, but few people
in Qu6bec would appreciate the delays that would result from the placement
of the federal administrative law cases back on the currently overburdened
rolls of the Superior Court.
However, the Working Paper would hand judicial supervision of extradi-
tion proceedings back to the superior courts of criminal jurisdiction, where
they should have remained in the first place, since extradition is more a
criminal than an administrative law matter.
The Commission's Paper also discusses the curious situation of members
of superior courts, whose decisions can be controlled by the Federal Court as
persona designata, but the Commission does not go so far as to suggest that
it is illogical to have a court of restricted jurisdiction supervising decisions
from courts of general jurisdiction. The Commission also maintains the con-
cept of persona designata so as to include provincial officers, even if such
supervisory power over provincially appointed persons appears a bit far-
fetched. Finally, the Commission recommends no change whatsoever in the
habeas corpus remedy, and has no solution to the problems created by the
duality of jurisdiction.
2. Court of Appeal and Trial Division Jurisdiction 1
The most important proposition of Working Paper No. 18 is to eliminate
sections 18 and 28 and create a new remedy-the "application for review"
before the Trial Division. As a result, the Court of Appeal would be relieved
of much of its present workload, and thereby allowed more time for reflection
and, supposedly, for more "enlightened" decisions.
This suggestion reflects the view, shared by a few people, that the Court
of Appeal, after a good start, has been so encumbered with review cases that
it has no more influence in the development of administrative law. Another
criticism concerns the nonuse of subsection (1) (c) of section 28, which
allows the Court to set aside a decision "based on an erroneous finding of
fact ... made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the
material .... " The unification of the present remedies would also reduce the
difficulties caused by the present bi-divisional system and especially by the
phraseology of section 28. However, some of the more detailed propositions
of the Commission on this point invite criticism. For instance, is it desirable
109 Working Paper No. 18, supra note 2, at 9-14.
110 Id. at 15-23.
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to give the Trial Division the power to transfer a case to the Appeal Court?
Is it practical to set up a specialized administrative law subdivision of the
Trial Division? The suppression of appeals on questions of law and the dis-
cretion left to the Appeal Court as to appeals from the Trial Division are not
necessarily beneficial, and no strong arguments have been advanced to sup-
port these changes. Other minor suggestions, such as transferring the immigra-
tion cases to the Trial Division and stopping the use of Federal Court judges
as Unemployment Insurance umpires, do not change the bi-divisional charac-
ter of the Court, but are welcome nevertheless.
3. Grounds and Procedure for Review"'
The proposed procedure for review would repeal all existing remedies,
including appeals on questions of law, and create a single application for
review. Probably inspired by the enumeration of grounds for review found
in section 28(1), the Commission proposes its own list that, fortunately, is
not limitative. It includes a new ground-unreasonable delay in reaching a
decision-that does not appear to be based on the common law. It also
includes "no evidence," which the Quibee Court of Appeal does not recog-
nize as affecting jurisdiction and therefore will not use to review a decision
wherever there is a privative clause.112 The Working Paper would thus abolish
the list of remedies as found in section 18, and draw instead an enumeration
of all forms of relief that can be granted under the proposed application for
review.
While eliminating some difficulties caused by the common law remedies
as well as section 28, this method may have a drawback-the possibility of
resurrecting the jurisdiction of the superior courts as an alternative forum for
judicial review. As we have seen, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court is to be
interpreted restrictively. Any supervisory power that is not vested exclusively
in the Court remains with the provincial courts. The enumeration of remedies
under section 18 has effectively ousted the jurisdiction of the superior courts.
It is not clear, however, whether the mere enumeration of available forms of
relief will be enough to convince the provincial courts that the status quo ante
has not been changed.
One additional point may be made as to the enumeration itself. At least
one form of relief-that granted by quo warranto-is not included in the
proposed list. Thus, the effect of implementing this proposition would be to
give back to the provincial courts their former jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings.
4. Administrative Action Subject to Judicial Review'"
The Commission's Working Paper reflects a very cautious attitude to-
wards some persons and bodies who have a privileged status under the pres-
ent Federal Court Act.
M Id. at 25-31.
11 Lefebvre v. Ledoux, [1973] C.A. 645.
113 Working Paper No. 18, supra note 2, at 33-38.
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The Crown is not mentioned in section 2; consequently, proceedings
against the Crown have to be instituted under section 17, and then, only
declaratory relief may be granted." 4 This may be the appropriate time to do
away with the total immunity of the Federal Crown in relation to prerogative
writs and injunctions, and to make it subject to the same law as everyone else.
The parallel regime set by section 17 is no longer justified by the constitu-
tional situation of the Crown.
The same cautious attitude was shown towards the Cabinet. The Com-
mission agrees that the Cabinet may be subject to a declaration under section
18, notwithstanding the fact that section 28 expressly excludes the Cabinet.
The Commission suggests that there should be an application for review of a
Cabinet decision, but only on "strict questions of legality, not fairness." This
approach is rather curious, coming from a "reform" commission, as it attempts
to turn back the clock as to judicial review. In fact, the Federal Court has
already accepted that the Cabinet is under the rule of law" and, in at least
one case, 6 has shown that it could examine whether the Cabinet had used
a proper procedure in revoking the pardon of a Qu6bec union official.
There is no recommendation regarding the other exceptions set by sec-
tion 28(6)-the Treasury Board, a superior court, the Pension Appeals
Board, courts martial. The Commission's only suggestion is that a study be
made as to the desirability of retaining these exceptions, a task that one would
presume to be well within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Finally, the Commission does suggest that natural justice should apply
to every type of administrative decision. This proposal seems rather revolu-
tionary for Canada, but would be in line with the judgment of the House of
Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin."7 However, a catch-22 is set by the last words
of the proposal: "unless the public interest that decisions conform with nat-
ural justice is outweighed by another public interest, such as efficiency in
government, national security, confidentiality, etc... ."It is difficult to evalu-
ate whether such a formula represents a step forward or backward!
Before any of the Working Paper's recommendations are adopted, it
might be a valuable exercise to reevaluate the need for the Federal Court as an
additional supervisory body. There should also be a reevaluation of the case
114 See MNR v. Creative Shoes, [1972] F.C. 933, 73 D.T.C. 5127 (F.C.A.). But
the Crown may be a party to proceedings under section 18 as the representative of a
person, or group of persons who do not have legal status to appear as a party. Cf. Land-
reville v. The Queen, [1973] F.C. 1223, 41 D.L.R. 574 (F.C.T.D.); and Smith v. The
Queen, [1972] F.C. 561, 28 D.L.R. (3d) 93 (F.C.T.D.).
115 Desardins v. Bouchard, [1976] 2 F.C. 539, 71 D.L.R. (3d) 491, 31 C.C.C. (2d)
506 (F.C.T.D.); Inuit Tapirasat v. Lgger (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 26 (F.C.T.D.). The
Federal Court of Appeal has since reversed the decision of the Trial Division in the
Inuit Tapirasat case, and has decided that the Governor-in-Council had a duty to act
fairly when hearing appeals from the CRTC. See note 95, supra.
"16 Desardins v. Bouchard, id.
"1 [1964] A.C. 40, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 (H.L.). The Supreme Court of Canada
has recently followed this decision in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Bd. of
Comm'rs of Police (1978), 23 N.R. 410.
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law concerning the sharing of jurisdiction between the Appeal and Trial divi-
sions of the Court. Nevertheless, some difficult questions that existed when
the Commission undertook its study of the Federal Court may now have been
clarified by the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
This "tableau en raccourci" of the law of remedies against public author-
ities in Qu6bec does not pretend to deal with every facet of this area of the
law. Its only purpose is to place in perspective the myriad of remedies cur-
rently in use, and the constitutional framework behind it. The situation will
certainly evolve towards a simplification of the present law. It is to be hoped
that the courts will no longer have to put so much emphasis on the niceties
of procedural questions, but rather, will deal with the real problems affecting
the parties involved.
